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SUMMARY
This work discusses the presence of a dogmatic tendency within modern cosmology,
and some ideas capable of neutralizing its negative influence. It is verified that warnings
about the dangers of dogmatic thinking in cosmology can be found as early as the
1930’s, and we discuss the modern appearance of “scientific dogmatism”. The solution
proposed to counteract such an influence, which is capable of neutralizing this dogmatic
tendency, has its origins in the philosophical thinking of the Austrian physicist Ludwig
Boltzmann (1844-1906). In particular we use his two main epistemological theses,
scientific theories as representations of nature and theoretical pluralism, to show that
once they are embodied in the research practice of modern cosmology, there is no longer
any reason for dogmatic behaviours.
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“In cosmological studies, then, a knowledge of the history and
philosophy of science is not a superfluity, it is a necessity.”
H. Dingle [1]
1 INTRODUCTION
In a recently published article, Matravers, Ellis and Stoeger [2] stressed that the develop-
ment of cosmology as a scientific discipline requires that cosmological models other than the
standard Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) models be considered as effective
alternatives to the standard cosmological scenario. They stated the thesis that the intrin-
sic power of those alternative models lies in the fact that, by approaching the cosmological
problem from a more descriptive and observationally oriented perspective, as opposed to the
standard view which starts from broad explanatory premises, one could observationally jus-
tify the latter. In this way those phenomenologically oriented cosmologies allow the possible
empirical confirmation, or denial, of the basis of the FLRW models.
Matravers et al. are aware of the fact that, so far, those complementary approaches,
including the one they specifically propose in the article, still lack the comprehensive ex-
planatory power achieved by the standard model, and, therefore, considerable work still
needs to be done in order to fill the gap between these two views, or even to implement some
of the steps outlined by the alternative approach to cosmology. Hence, they do not regard
the standard model as outdated. On the contrary, they wish to keep it in a healthy contact
with observational issues and to develop a more self-critical and less doctrinaire cosmology
where the two complementary approaches to cosmology can interact in a mutually beneficial
way [2, p. 31].
However, it is from within the community favorable only to the standard FLRW model
that Matravers et al. indicate the existence of a strong resistance in recognizing and allowing
that the theoretical work is vulnerable to observational falsification, pointing out that such a
resistance is especially prevalent among the researchers favorable to the inflationary scenario
[2, p. 35]. Their paper can, therefore, be seen as an attempt to counteract what can only be
described as a latent dogmatic tendency coming from within the cosmological community.
For this reason, they also stress the need for a more self-critical attitude from researchers of
the field in general. In their words:
In fact, a rather serious and disturbing situation has developed within modern cosmology, in
which some workers promote certain cosmological theories as correct and well-established
without seeming to regard the adequacy of their observational or experimental justification
as of any importance. At the same time they tend to dismiss more observationally-based
approaches – for example the kind of larger justificatory investigation we have just pro-
posed – as being unnecessary or even ‘unscientific’, simply because such approaches do
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not unquestioningly incorporate the standard view. This attitude is itself dangerously close
to being unscientific, for it elevates theory above observation and relies on simplified geo-
metrical models (certainly of considerable explanatory power) without subjecting them to
adequate observational testing – or even denying that they should be tested [2, p. 31].
We agree with Matravers et al. that a rather dogmatic and dangerously unscientific
attitude has developed in modern cosmology [2, p. 35]. Other authors like Tolman [3], Mac-
Callum [4], Wesson [5], Rothman and Ellis [6], Krasin´ski [7] and, especially, de Vaucouleurs
[8], have also expressed similar views. They all warned of the danger of strongly believing
in ideas not confirmed by observations, pointing out that without this confirmation we lose
the only way we can distinguish science from metaphysics. For instance, de Vaucouleurs was
very clear about this point:
Unfortunately, a study of the history of modern cosmology (. . . ) reveals disturbing par-
allelisms between modern cosmology and medieval scholasticism. (. . . ) Above all I am
concerned by an apparent loss of contact with empirical evidence and observational facts,
and, worse, by a deliberate refusal on the part of some theorists to accept such results
when they appear to be in conflict with some of the present oversimplified and therefore
intellectually appealing theories of the universe. (. . . ) [That concern] is due to a more
basic distrust of doctrines that frequently seem to be more concerned with the fictitious
properties of ideal (and therefore nonexistent) universes than with the actual world revealed
by observations [8].
The few quotations and references above do not indicate a widespread presence of dog-
matism among cosmologists, but simply its presence among at least some of them. However,
the fact that at different times, different people possessing different theoretical and obser-
vational perspectives and motivations, not only acknowledged the presence of dogmatism in
cosmological research, but were also worried about its influence, is enough to show that such
an influence is not negligible and should be investigated. Therefore, it is reasonable to say
that dogmatic tendencies have been felt in the field since at least the 1930’s.
Nevertheless, it is clear that those dogmatic tendencies within modern cosmology have
little to do with the FLRW model itself, whose achievements so far can only be described
as impressive. They result from the attitude of not accepting that some key features derived
from those models can be checked, let alone questioned, by observations. When a feature of a
model is ascertained through imposition rather than by experimental or observational check
it is unscientific because it is only based on personal choices. In other words, a certainty
achieved that way becomes a dogma.
Here we shall discuss the issue of dogmatism in modern cosmology. We accept the quo-
tations and references above as sufficiently enough evidence of its presence in modern cos-
mology, and we will propose a way capable of neutralizing its influence. In our opinion, that
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can be achieved if researchers in the field embody the epistemological principles advanced
by Ludwig Boltzmann (1844-1906) from the end of the 19th century until his death.
2 DOGMATISM IN MODERN PHYSICS
It is generally accepted that scientific truth is achieved when theory is directly confronted
with observations (or experiments). Since the time of Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), observa-
tion and/or experimentation has been used to confirm or to falsify a theory, and without
such crucial tests no theory can be considered scientific. To accept a theory without this
experimental/observational validation is to accept it as a dogma.
However, things are not so simple when such a validation is not clear cut and free from
ambiguities, which in practice is the case most of the time when doing real science. In such
situations dogmatic tendencies can thrive. Those tendencies appear in the history of physics
more frequently than one may imagine. An example particularly important to the subject
discussed in this article was the debate between Boltzmann and Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-
1932) at the end of last century concerning the atomic view of the world. At stake was the
definition of a scientific theory, what should be its aims and methods, and the definition of
scientific truth.
2.1 Boltzmann and the dogmatism in Physics at the end of the last century
By the end of the last century, Boltzmann was engaged in a passionate defense of the
atomic concept which, at the time, was facing a growing number of powerful opponents,
like Ostwald and Georg Helm (1851-1923), who considered the atomic picture of the world
outdated [9, 10, 11, 12, 13], [14, p. 42-61]. They then advocated its replacement by the view
that the physical world could only be correctly described by means of the concept of energy
conservation and its derivatives, which implied the denial of the atomic idea [13, 15].
Boltzmann feared that such a purely energetic representation would lead physics to be-
come dogmatic, a fact that would inevitably also lead to its stagnation. He then wrote many
epistemological texts about the development of physics in general, whose conclusions led him
to advance what is now considered his two main epistemological theses [14, 15]. The first
one stated that a physical theory is nothing more than a representation of Nature, and the
second thesis stated that Nature can be represented by many different theories, which can
even be opposed to each other. Nowadays this last thesis is known as theoretical pluralism.
Among the physicists of the last one hundred and fifty years, Boltzmann was one of
the few, if not the only one from within the scientific community and, therefore, from the
perspective of an active and eminent physicist, to discuss dogmatism in an epistemological
context. His epistemological thinking covers issues like what a scientific theory is and how it
develops. For those reasons, we believe that his ideas give us the appropriate epistemological
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framework which allows us to identify and counteract what can inhibits the development of
scientific theories, namely dogmatism.
Nevertheless, one may ask the question: how is it possible that dogmatic tendencies can
thrive even when the scientific community openly accepts that the ultimate test of a theory
is experimentation? We shall discuss this point next.
2.2 What is “scientific” dogmatism?
It is generally accepted nowadays that in science nothing is in principle unquestionable, but,
inasmuch as the validation of new theories and models usually takes time, a certain degree of
conservatism towards new theories and models, and skepticism towards new observations, is,
nevertheless, necessary since it is not possible to build a sound conceptual and experimental
scientific body when there is a continual change in the fundamental scientific concepts. Such
skepticism is also evidence of the existence of critique in science, which is one of the most
important ingredients of modern scientific reasoning and practice. Therefore, orthodoxy
plays the healthy role of preserving the scientific knowledge obtained on solid bases until
new theories prove to have sufficient internal consistency and experimental validation.
However, when strong conservatism and orthodoxy becomes deep rooted in the scientific
community, a situation may arise that, if not effectively and successfully challenged, may
lead the community to avoid altogether any kind of change of the established ideas. Such
a rejection to change may easily turn to aggression towards the proposers of new ideas. In
such an environment the established theories crystallize, becoming dogmatic, and scientific
debate ceases to exist.
Such strong conservatism and orthodoxy very frequently come about when researchers
mistakenly take their theories to be the researched objects themselves, believing that the
former coincide with the latter. By doing this, they identify theory with object, and in this
identification it is implicitly or explicitly assumed that the role of a scientific theory is to
bring to our knowledge Nature itself. Therefore, for those researchers scientific truth means
exactly such identification.
This behaviour can be detected when scientists become unreasonably over-confident that
their theories are true, in the sense that, in their opinion, Nature does follow them. Besides,
those who are prone to this kind of behaviour frequently do not accept any challenge to their
way of thinking. That makes matters even worse, since they may reinforce the conservatism
present at some particular moment by helping to turn a healthy skepticism towards new
observations that challenge established ideas into an out of hand rejection of them.
When a situation like that takes place, it creates an environment where, in the view
of those described above, the theory considered as the best “realization” of the researched
object assumes the role of the supreme and only truth, never to be questioned. In these
days, however, science has become very dynamic and the theory elected to be the true
5
representation of Nature in some particular area, and at some particular time, can be quickly
toppled from its position due to the unexpected arrival and imposing character of new data
or new discoveries. Then, if the dogmatic attitude remains, what happens next is the urgent
search and eventual replacement of the toppled theory by a new “supreme theoretical truth”
which then becomes the dogma of the day.
The conservatism in the process described above can throw the scientific community
into deep confusion because, if the community is large enough, opinions may be different
among the different research groups in the search for the new dogma. Then one may expect
a disagreement about the choice of “the best” theory, with the different groups choosing
different theories. So, we end up having a conflict of dogma within the community rather
than a scientific debate, which in practice becomes marginalized or may even cease to exist.
One may therefore define scientific dogmatism as being the unreasonably and unjustified
over-confidence in certain theory, over-confidence which stems from the misleading, and often
unconscious, identification of the researched object with its correspondent theory. Such
identification implicitly or explicitly assumes that the role of a scientific theory is to reveal
Nature itself to us. Such dogmatism causes over-confident researchers to deliberately refuse
as scientifically valid any theoretical pictures different from theirs since, in their view, those
different theoretical pictures would “contradict Nature itself”. As we shall see, Boltzmann’s
epistemological theses are particularly useful in clarifying this question. While they preserve
the freedom of personal choice in the creative theoretical work, they also deny the notion
that we can ever achieve an ultimate knowledge of any scientific question, that is, they deny
that we can reach Nature itself, since in Boltzmann’s view any theory is nothing more than
a representation (image) of Nature [16, 17].
3 SCIENTIFIC THEORIES AS REPRESENTATIONS OF NATURE
As stated above, at the end of the last century Boltzmann was engaged in a passionate
defense of his viewpoints, where he sought to show that all scientific theories are nothing
more than representations of the natural phenomena. By being a representation, a scientific
theory cannot aim to know Nature itself, knowledge which would explain why the natural
phenomena show themselves to us the way we observe them, since such ultimate knowledge is,
and will ever be, unknowable. As a consequence, a scientific theory will never be complete
or definitively true. This viewpoint actually redefines the concept of scientific truth by
advancing the notion that it is impossible to identify theory with the researched objects
since scientific theories are nothing more than images of Nature (see §3.2 below). In other
words, a scientific theory can, one day, be replaced by another. It is the possibility of the
replacement of one theory by another that defines and constitutes the scientific progress,
and that is diametrically opposed to dogmatism [11, 12].
Boltzmann’s ideas about scientific models as representations are clearly stated in the
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passage below, quoted from the entry model of the 1902 edition of the Encyclopedia Bri-
tannica:
Models in the mathematical, physical and mechanical sciences are of the greatest impor-
tance. Long ago philosophy perceived the essence of our process of thought to lie in the
fact that we attach to the various real objects around us particular physical attributes – our
concepts – and by means of these try to represent the objects to our minds. Such views
were formerly regarded by mathematicians and physicists as nothing more than unfertile
speculations, but in more recent times they have been brought by J. C. Maxwell, H. v.
Helmholtz, E. Mach, H. Hertz and many others into intimate relation with the whole body
of mathematical and physical theory. On this view our thoughts stand to things in the
same relation as models to the objects they represent. The essence of the process is the
attachment of one concept having a definite content to each thing, but without implying
complete similarity between thing and thought; for naturally we can know but little of the
resemblance of our thoughts to the things to which we attach them. What resemblance
there is lies principally in the nature of the connexion, the correlation being analogous to
that which obtains between thought and language, language and writing. (. . . ) Here, of
course, the symbolization of the thing is the important point, though, where feasible, the
utmost possible correspondence is sought between the two (. . . ) we are simply extending
and continuing the principle by means of which we comprehend objects in thought and
represent them in language or writing [18, p. 213].
It should be noted that the idea that scientific theories are representations is still being
echoed today, and an example of a recent discussion can be found in [19].
3.1 Theoretical Pluralism
The most important epistemological conclusion which was reached by Boltzmann from his
debate against Ostwald’s energeticism, and which constitutes the core of his philosophical
thinking, is usually called theoretical pluralism. This is a consequence of the thesis that
all scientific theories are representations of Nature. By being a representation, a scientific
theory is, therefore, initially a free creation of the scientist who can formulate it from a purely
personal perspective, where metaphysical presuppositions, theoretical options, preferences
for a certain type of mathematical language, and even the dismissal of some observational
data, can enter into its formulation. All that in the period where the theory is formulated.
However, in order to make this theory eligible to become part of science, it is necessary for
it to be confronted by the experience [20, §16, p. 286], [21, p. 107]. If it is not approved in
this crucial test, the theory must be reformulated, or even put aside [20, p. 286], [21, p. 225-
226]. Boltzmann also emphasized that, since all scientific theories are, to some extent, free
creations of scientists, scientific work is impossible without the use of theoretical concepts,
which originates from the fact that it is impossible the formulation of any scientific theory
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simply from the mere observation of natural phenomena.
The theoretical pluralism also states that the same natural phenomenon can be explained
through different theories. Still according to Boltzmann, this possibility has its origins in
the fact that, as seen above, any theory is a representation, a construction, an image of the
natural world. And nothing more. One cannot do science in any other way. Either it is a
construction, a representation, or the theory is not scientific [14, p. 173-176], [22, p. 216],
[23, p. 91]. In Boltzmann’s words,
(. . . ) Hertz makes physicists properly aware of something philosophers had no doubt long
since stated, namely that no theory can be objective, actually coinciding with nature, but
rather that each theory is only a mental picture of phenomena, related to them as sign is
to designatum.
From this it follows that it cannot be our task to find an absolutely correct theory but
rather a picture that is, as simple as possible and that represents phenomena as accurately
as possible. One might even conceive of two quite different theories both equally simple
and equally congruent with phenomena, which therefore in spite of their difference are
equally correct. The assertion that a given theory is the only correct one can only express
our subjective conviction that there could not be another equally simple and fitting image
[23, p. 90].
In summary, theoretical pluralism synthesizes the fact that, since knowledge of Na-
ture itself is impossible, a theory can only be better than another, not truer in the non-
Boltzmannian sense (see §3.2 below). It is the necessary mechanism which prevents science
from running the risk of stagnation. Within this perspective, truth can only be provisional,
and is in fact an approximation achieved by different means, that is, by different theoretical
images [20, p. 273, §3], [21, p. 115-116].
When Boltzmann advanced theoretical pluralism, he also had another goal: to establish
a clear and unreachable limit for dogmatism, that is, a limit which it could not surpass.
Boltzmann believed that once theoretical pluralism were accepted and embodied in research
practice, it would not allow that, once proposed, a theory could be excluded from the scien-
tific scenario.
Boltzmann also pointed out that the thesis that a scientific theory is a representation was
not new. Kant, in the 18th century, and Maxwell, one of the most important influences upon
him in the middle of the last century, had both defended similar theses. Other contemporary
physicists, like Hertz and Helmholtz, shared similar views [22, p. 206], [23, p. 83]. By
remembering that others like Kant and Maxwell had already expressed similar propositions,
Boltzmann wished to make sure that any theory or model would be continuously perfected,
without being excluded by any other “tribunal” than the experience [14, chap. 4]. But,
before we go into the relationship between Boltzmann’s theoretical pluralism and modern
cosmology, we need to discuss in more detail Boltzmann’s notion of scientific truth.
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3.2 Boltzmann’s Concept of Truth
One of the main features of modern science is that since the beginning of the modern scien-
tific revolution with Galileo, scientists began to define truth as the correspondence between
models and observations. Nevertheless, since Boltzmann’s theses state that all scientific
theories are representations of natural phenomena, that is, they are not capable of deter-
mining what really constitutes Nature, the concept of truth in modern science should no
longer be one which seeks to determine Nature itself. Therefore, within the context of Boltz-
mann’s epistemological thinking, this concept of correspondence as scientific truth becomes
outdated as Boltzmann’s views are based upon the principle of theoretical pluralism. As a
consequence, since more than one model, or theory, may well represent the same group of
natural phenomena and/or experimental data, how it is possible that scientists can choose
one model among the possible ones?
At this moment Boltzmann advances another definition of scientific truth: the adequacy.
According to him, theory A is more adequate than theory B if the former is capable of
explaining more rationally, more intelligibly, a certain set of natural phenomena, than the
latter. In his own words,
(. . . ) let me choose as goal of the present talk not just kinetic molecular theory but a largely
specialized branch of it. Far from wishing to deny that this contains hypothetical elements,
I must declare that branch to be a picture that boldly transcends pure facts of observation,
and yet I regard it as not unworthy of discussion at this point; a measure of my confidence
in the utility of the hypotheses as soon as they throw new light on certain peculiar features
of the observed facts, representing their interrelation with a clarity unattainable by other
means. Of course we shall always have to remember that we are dealing with hypotheses
capable and needful of constant further development and to be abandoned only when all
the relations they represent can be understood even more clearly in some other way [24, p.
163].
(. . . ) We must not aspire to derive nature from our concepts, but must adapt the latter to
the former. We must not think that everything can be arranged according to our categories
or that there is such a thing as a most perfect arrangement: it will only ever be a variable
one, merely adapted to current needs [24, p. 166].
He also noted that since theories are images of Nature, all have some explanatory power,
and that a good theory is achieved by being carefully crafted by scientists, in a process
similar to Darwin’s Natural Selection:
Mach himself has ingeniously discussed the fact that no theory is absolutely true, and equally
hardly any absolutely false either, but each must gradually be perfected, as organisms must
according to Darwin’s theory. By being strongly attacked, a theory can gradually shed
inappropriate elements while the appropriate residue remains [25, p. 153].
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Once more, one should note that these ideas are still being echoed today (for instance,
see [19, p. 214]).
3.3 The Search for a Good Theory
It is important to stress that although theories are representations, and, as we saw above,
personal theoretical options can enter in their formulation, they are not entirely arbitrary.
The basic aim of any theory is to represent something that is going on in Nature, and a
successful theory does achieve this to a considerable extent. Therefore, such a theory can
use some symbols, or a specific mathematical language, just as conventions. However, since
Nature itself must be represented in it, conventions will always be limited to only those
aspects of the model, of the representation, which are not perceived, in that theory, as
being directly dictated by Nature. Thus, under Boltzmann’s perspective, one cannot say
that theories are just conventions, because after being carefully crafted by the scientists as
representations of unique, non-arbitrary, natural phenomena, they become attached to them,
and end up saying something unique about what is going on in Nature.
Finally, besides being a good representation, there is still another criterion capable of
conducting the preference of scientists towards one particular model: its predictive ability.
This is important because once a certain theoretical prediction is confirmed, the scientific
knowledge about Nature increases quantitatively. A correct prediction is also important
because it is formulated within the context of a specific theoretical picture. So, by being
capable of predicting unknown phenomena, a model shows all its explanatory power since
it is not only capable of announcing the already known “pieces”, but it is also able to go
even further, showing the existence of other still missing pieces which are necessary for a
deeper and more organized understanding of Nature. One cannot forget that one of the most
important aims of science is to increase and organize our knowledge about Nature, and thus,
a certain theory is richer than others if it is able to better contribute to such an increase and
organization. Such a preference for the richer theories makes them more likely to be used,
and developed, than the poorer ones, and after a while the distance between them may be
so great that it may no longer be worth for researchers to keep on working with the poorer
representations, which are then put aside and, usually, forgotten.
4 COSMOLOGICAL MODELS AS IMAGES OF THE UNIVERSE
In order to relate the previous discussion to issues in cosmology we need, first of all, to
distinguish Nature from its representations, that is, from our theoretical images. Therefore,
we shall adopt the following difference between the terms ‘Universe’ and ‘universe’. The
first term, with capital ‘U’, will refer to the aspects of Nature from which the different
theoretical models are built, while the second one, with small ‘u’, will refer to the models
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themselves. By means of this distinction, and bearing in mind Boltzmann’s theses, we can
state that the different theoretical models of the Universe are then “universe models”, that
is, “cosmological models”, or simply “cosmologies” or “universes”. Cosmology is then the
science that attempts to create working representations of the Universe.2 As a consequence,
theoretical pluralism tells us that there may be many different cosmologies, where each one
adopts different images of the Universe, although its true nature is, and will always be,
unknowable.
From the perspective described in the previous sections we can see how damaging dog-
matic thinking can be, since in its most basic sense it denies the cosmological community the
option of thinking differently than the current accepted view. That inhibits the appearance
of different theoretical representations, which, according to the thesis of theoretical plural-
ism, are fundamental for the development of modern cosmology. In other words, dogmatism
goes against theoretical pluralism. Therefore, bearing in mind what we discussed in §1, it
is not only desirable, but essential that different theoretical pictures, i.e., theoretical repre-
sentations other than the FLRW model emerge, be considered and developed in cosmology
nowadays. The present day dominance of the standard model, due to its impressive achieve-
ments, should not be used as argument against the emergence of models which may challenge
the standard FLRW picture. And if in the end those different representations are wrong or
produce worse models than the standard, cosmology will gain in the process, especially the
FLRW cosmologies.
One must stress that the theoretical pluralism does not necessarily imply competition
among the different theories, but often means complementarity. This is exactly what Ma-
travers, Ellis and Stoeger [2] seek when they argue in favour of a more phenomenological
approach to cosmology. Inasmuch as, according to Boltzmann’s theses, all theories have some
explanatory power, all cosmologies end up saying something about the physical process that
are going on in the Universe, because not all cosmologies use the same set of ideas and phe-
nomena which they seek to explain. Therefore, the emergence of different cosmologies, far
from being a problem for our better understanding of the Universe, is essential for it. And if
those different cosmologies have elements which contradict each other, observations provide
the first mechanism, but not the only one, which allows us to discard the inappropriate
elements of the emergent cosmologies.
The different cosmologies should either be in competition among themselves or comple-
ment each other, but as none can be confused with the Universe, no cosmology produces
ultimate knowledge of it. One cosmological model can only be provisionally better than an-
other. It is our observational interaction with the Universe that produces the empirical basis
2 The terms Universe, universe, cosmologies, etc, are found in the literature as usually having meanings
close to the ones given in this article. Therefore, what is being done here is only to state precisely their
meanings in this context.
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upon which cosmologies are created, and inasmuch as this interaction is basically technologi-
cal, this empirical basis will be changed by technological and theoretical progress which itself
creates the conditions for the partial or complete transformation of the cosmological models.
By the same token, the diversity of technological means produces different interactions and,
therefore, different empirical basis that lead to possible different cosmologies.
5 CONCLUSION
From what we have seen in the previous sections, we can conclude that dogmatism works
against scientific progress and, to avoid it, a change of attitude should be adopted by cos-
mologists. This change is realized by the adoption of the theoretical pluralism as a better
epistemological framework for research in cosmology. By means of this thesis it is possible
to avoid the deep rooted and unjustified belief in ideas which are nothing more than just
personal beliefs. As seen above, those ideas are necessary, and perhaps indispensable, for the
formulation of the different representations of Nature, as such formulation is also a result of
the free creation of the scientists. However, those personal beliefs will always be restricted
to the theoretical models and, at best, they can only generate better, or worse, representa-
tions of Nature. Moreover, they should never be confused with the “true” Universe since its
ultimate reality is unknowable.
Inasmuch as no cosmological model can ever be capable of holding ultimate knowledge
about the Universe, then it follows that no cosmology can hold eternal truths. Then, the
larger the number of cosmologies available to cosmologists, the higher the chances of we
obtaining better representations of the Universe.
Scientific knowledge is best characterized by the continuous search for better, but never
definitive, representations of natural phenomena. The replacement of a theory by another,
the main feature of modern science, can only happen if it is assured that no scientific theory
can reach the stage of definitive truth. In other words, a scientific theory can only be better
than another one, and nothing more. Therefore, since any cosmological model can only aim
to be a temporary explanation of what one chooses or is able to observe and experiment in
the Universe, when it is formulated it is already doomed to disappear. The irony always
present is that no one can tell with precision when that will happen, unless one takes a
dogmatic posture.
In conclusion, we believe that it would be essential that cosmologists in general recognize
that their theories and models about the Universe are nothing more than representations.
This explicit distinction is very important as it would create the proper environment where
different theories and models can live together without the danger of dogmatism.
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